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“He would be expected to crack”
Battle Exhaustion, Desertion and the Court 
Martial of Lieutenant R. J. Woods 
M A T T H E W  B A R R E T T
Abstract : This article examines psychological breakdown, combat stress 
and military justice through the 1945 general court martial of Lieutenant 
Reginald James Woods. During his first day in combat with the Lake 
Superior Regiment (Motor) on 17 August 1944, the twenty-five-year-old 
platoon leader disappeared. Woods remerged nearly two months later in 
London where he claimed to suffer from amnesia. The subsequent medical 
investigation and legal proceedings forced Canadian authorities to 
grapple with assumptions about combat leadership, mental responsibility 
and criminal culpability. This article adopts a graphic history approach 
to illustrate the subjective and contingent nature of memory and truth 
through the fog of war.
In the weeks after d-day, the Canadian Army endured brutal fighting as the Allies pressed the attack against the retreating 
German forces. In addition to thousands of Canadians killed in 
Normandy throughout summer 1944, over one quarter of the non-
fatal casualties succumbed to emotional exhaustion, mental trauma 
or neuropsychiatric injury.1 While attitudes toward combat stress had 
shifted since the First World War, when most sufferers had been 
labelled with shell shock, many doctors and generals in 1944 still 
1  Terry Copp and Bill McAndrew, Battle Exhaustion: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in 
the Canadian Army, 1939–1945 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1990), 126; and Robert Engen, Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the 
Canadian Army, 1943-1945 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2016), 146-47.
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believed that genuine battle exhaustion only came after a prolonged 
period of struggle and fatigue that had finally drained a man’s 
willpower. Worn-out but proven veterans who wavered were more 
likely to receive understanding and lenient treatment from medical 
officers and superiors. New reinforcements who showed nerves or 
seemed to collapse too quickly were often stigmatised as predisposed 
to emotional instability due to personal issues, mental abnormality or 
weak character.2 In such cases, military authorities deemed discipline 
and punishment as more appropriate responses to an apparent 
unwillingness to fight. 
The experience of one Canadian junior officer during this period 
exposed the complicated medical and legal issues involved in charges 
of serious military misconduct. During an advance with the Lake 
Superior Regiment (LSR) toward the French town of Trun on 17 
August 1944, Lieutenant (Lieut.) Reginald James Woods vanished 
when his company came under enemy mortar and artillery fire. After 
resurfacing in England two months later, he was subject to medical 
evaluation for suspected hysteria before eventually being tried by a 
general court martial for desertion. This article uses Woods’ case not 
only to explore the legal, medical and administrative responses to 
an officer’s failure in battle, but it also narrates his war experience 
through an experimental illustrated approach called graphic history. 
Following a written examination of the context and circumstances 
behind the case and an explanation of graphic history as scholarship, I 
visualise the events based on Woods’ personnel file and court martial 
transcript. This article argues that studying the case through graphic 
history makes visually clear the gaps and silences in the historical 
record. Uncertainties about motivation and behaviour are particularly 
evident in the fog of battle because the vast complexity and ambiguity 
involved makes a complete picture from every perspective unknowable.3 
Representing Woods’ unique experience therefore depends on piecing 
together different accounts, corroborating from witness testimony 
and acknowledging that informed imagination plays a crucial role in 
the assembly of a coherent and meaningful story.
2  Copp and McAndrew, Battle Exhaustion, 58-59, 103-04.
3  Linda Warley and Alan Filewod, “Visual Silence and Graphic Memory: An 
Interdisciplinary approach to Two Generals,” in Canadian Graphic: Picturing Life 
Narratives, eds. Candida Rifkind and Linda Warley (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier 
University Press, 2016), 153-75.
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leadership and combat stress
R. J. Woods, a twenty-five-year-old store clerk from Port Arthur, 
Ontario, joined the LSR in France as a reinforcement officer on 16 
August 1944. A motorised infantry regiment, the LSR belonged to the 
4th Armoured Brigade in the 4th Canadian (Armoured) Division.4 
Woods reported for duty amidst Operation Tractable in which the 
4th Brigade was to play an important role in the wider Allied strategy 
to close the Falaise Gap and attempt to trap hundreds of thousands 
of German troops.5 The day after Woods arrived and assumed 
command of No. 12 Platoon, the LSR came under a German mortar 
barrage while it moved toward Trun. When his company regrouped 
to continue the advance, Woods was nowhere to be found. Command 
of the platoon fell to a sergeant. The inexplicable disappearance of 
a platoon leader was the latest command change during the crucial 
operations in Normandy. A week earlier, the LSR commanding 
officer (CO) Lieutenant-Colonel (Lt.-Col.) J. E. V. Murrell had been 
wounded and replaced. The 4th Brigade commander Brigadier Leslie 
Booth had been killed when his tank was hit by enemy fire at the 
outset of the operation on 14 August. Disruptions to the chain of 
command at both senior and junior levels could undermine morale 
and harm unit cohesion, which made suspected dereliction of duty a 
very serious offence.
Rather than an isolated example of small-unit level failure in 
battle, Woods’ disappearance must also be understood from the 
perspective of breakdowns in leadership at the battalion, brigade 
and division levels. Murrell’s injuries had precipitated his removal, 
but he was one of several battalion commanders who had proven to 
be unreliable.6 Under the stressful battlefield conditions, even some 
generals began to show signs of cracking. Major-General George 
Kitching, the 4th Division commander, later admitted that he had 
discovered Booth drunk in his tank on 8 August. Such a serious 
4  The LSR served alongside the 21st Armoured Regiment (The Governor General’s 
Foot Guards), 22nd Armoured Regiment (The Canadian Grenadier Guards) and 
28th Armoured Regiment (The British Columbia Regiment).
5  John English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of 
Failure in High Command (New York: Praeger, 1991), 293-300.
6  Angelo N. Caravaggio, “Commanding the Green Centre Line in Normandy: A Case 
Study of Division Command in the Second World War” (PhD dissertation, Wilfrid 
Laurier University, 2013), 403.
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breach of discipline warranted a charge under the Army Act, but 
Kitching only privately reprimanded his brigadier. Historian Brian 
A. Reid notes “the nagging suspicion that Kitching felt that it would 
not be quite ‘on’ to subject a senior officer to the public humiliation 
of a court martial, or perhaps at the least, admission to a psychiatric 
hospital.”7 Booth’s death days later and Kitching’s postwar discretion 
meant that the episode would not become more widely known for 
years. In part due to the perceived delay of Operation Tractable to 
close the Falaise Gap and concerns about his lack of drive, Kitching 
himself was relieved from command and demoted on 21 August 1944. 
The replacement of Murrell and Kitching, the drunkenness of Booth 
and the disappearance of Woods highlighted how the Normandy 
campaign exposed deficiencies in command at all levels.8
It is within this broader context of leadership problems that this 
article examines the administrative, medical and legal responses 
to Woods’ potential desertion. In the initial weeks after he had 
vanished on 17 August, army officials sent Woods’ wife Gladys a 
telegram that he had been reported missing in action. After nearly 
two months, the wayward lieutenant suddenly appeared at Canadian 
Military Headquarters (CMHQ) in London on 10 October 1944. As 
Woods claimed memory loss, a medical officer ordered him to No. 1 
Neurological Hospital, otherwise known as “No. 1 Nuts.” The hospital 
based at Hackwood House near Basingstoke specialised in treating 
battle exhaustion and psychoneurosis. Doctors created detailed case 
histories that covered everything from patients’ childhood phobias and 
sexual habits to emotional stability in civilian life and adjustments 
to military service.9 The medical investigation and eventual legal 
proceedings into Woods’ case reflected how Canadian authorities 
grappled with assumptions about neuropsychiatric injury, criminal 
culpability and expectations for good leadership.
From a medical perspective, the nature of Woods’ condition 
centred on three questions: Was it a genuine illness? Was it 
7  Brian A. Reid, No Holding Back: Operation Totalize, Normandy, August 1944 
(Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2009), 302.
8  Douglas Delaney, Corps Commanders: Five British and Canadian Generals at 
War, 1939-45 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011), 236-37.
9  Terry Copp, “The Development of Neuropsychiatry in the Canadian Army 
(Overseas) 1939-1943,” in Canadian Health Care and the State: A Century of 
Evolution, ed. David Naylor (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1992), 67-84.
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attributable to combat? And was he mentally competent to have 
distinguished right from wrong? One neuropsychiatric specialist 
suspected that Woods’ amnesia had resulted from hysteria, but he 
could not confirm whether the overall condition had been triggered 
by combat stress alone, an anxious personality or a combination 
of the two. Lt.-Col. C. E. G. Gould, commanding officer of the 
neuropsychiatric unit at Basingstoke, believed Woods was faking 
to conceal his deliberate misconduct in France. Although Gould 
personally felt it had been “very reprehensible to let [Woods] go 
into the reinforcement stream to lead men in battle,” he also found 
no evidence of a genuine psychiatric illness that could mitigate 
the lieutenant’s alleged crime.10 According to Gould, most officers 
who proved unsuitable or incompetent in the field were problems of 
personnel selection and training rather than cases of mental illness. 
When screening reinforcement drafts for the Italian campaign, 
Gould had complained that “grossly inadequate men” were being 
put into combat only to be labelled psychiatric casualties after even 
“mild” battle exposure.11 From this perspective, skeptical battalion 
commanders and medical officers suspected that in many cases 
combat only triggered a latent susceptibility to nervous collapse.
Through effective personnel screening, some Canadian Army 
psychiatrists argued that officers prone to “inherent instability” could 
be identified as incapable of leadership in active warfare even prior 
to deployment. Major W. A. Hawke, consultant psychiatrist to the 
director general of medical services, explained in April 1944: “It is 
the general opinion that an unstable individual is more liable to break 
down if he has a commission… The added responsibilities of an officer, 
the care and handling of men, etc., make the difference.”12 While 
some doctors assumed that officers whose personal backgrounds 
showed signs of instability or maladjustment were more likely to 
crack, the scale of neuropsychiatric casualties revealed no predictable 
or consistent pattern of who could be affected.13 After D-Day, 
10  General Court Martial [GCM] of Lieutenant [Lieut.] R. J. Woods, RG 24, reel 
T-15777, file 55-W-722, Library and Archives Canada [LAC].
11  Copp and McAndrew, Battle Exhaustion, 60-61.
12  Minutes of Conference, Officers’ Survey and Classification Boards (OSCB), 5-6 
April 1944, RG 24-C-1, reel C-5139, file 8151-10, LAC.
13  Adam Montgomery, Invisible Injured: Psychological Trauma in the Canadian 
Military from the First World War to Afghanistan (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2017), 67-68.
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one infantry lieutenant described how assumptions about soldiers’ 
susceptibility to nerves did not match the reality once the fighting 
began. “Some of my nervous types stood up better than the stolid 
types,” he observed. “One stolid type went very fast. Some of the 
nervous types are doing a grand job… I wouldn’t go so far as to say 
what a man would be like.”14
Veterans of the First World War understood that the stressful 
and traumatic conditions of modern warfare could produce erratic 
behaviours and bizarre symptoms in even presumably normal men. 
In his 1945 book, Anatomy of Courage, Lord Moran drew on his 
experiences as a Royal Army Medical Corps officer in 1916 to argue 
that every man possessed a finite amount of nervous energy akin 
to a bank account. The daily grind of trench life slowly drained the 
account while a sudden traumatic event such as a shell explosion 
caused the account to become overdrawn, which triggered a mental 
breakdown.15 By 1918, the British Army had instituted a form of 
forward treatment to diagnose nervous patients either with shell 
shock or neurasthenia. Believing that shell shock largely resulted 
from the concussion blast of a shell explosion, army doctors provided 
sufferers with a short rest to replenish their nervous energy before 
returning them to the front. Based on evolving theories of human 
behaviour, many neuropsychiatrists and psychologists claimed to 
have solved the mystery of shell shock by the end of the First World 
War. Postwar medical opinion assumed that the strange nervous 
symptoms exhibited by sufferers signified psychogenic responses to 
mental overstain rather than signs of a physical concussion injury.16
Believing that the evocative connotation of the term had ingrained 
an idea that shell explosions inevitably produced nervous symptoms, 
medical and military leaders largely banned shell shock as an official 
diagnosis category in the Second World War. Canadian medical 
officers instead attributed neurotic symptoms to battle exhaustion.17 
14  GCM of Lieut. D. W. McKinney, RG 24, reel T-15706, file 55-M-3420, LAC.
15  Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage: The Classic WWI Study of the Psychological 
Effects of War (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 67-69.
16  For more on the medical history of shell shock and combat stress, see Copp and 
McAndrew, Battle Exhaustion; Montgomery, Invisible Injured; Mark Humphries, 
A Weary Road: Shell Shock in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018); and Meghan Fitzpatrick, Invisible 
Scars: Mental Trauma and the Korean War (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 2017).
17  Copp and McAndrew, Battle Exhaustion, 13-22.
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The term implied that an affected soldier or officer had experienced 
prolonged nervous overstrain from combat stress. As Terry Copp 
outlines, “The large majority of individuals diagnosed as suffering 
from Battle Exhaustion exhibited what the psychiatrists described 
as acute fear reactions and acute and chronic anxiety manifested 
through uncontrollable tremors, a pronounced startle reaction 
to war-related sounds, and a profound loss of self-confidence.”18 
Although every service member had a breaking point when 
willpower became depleted, battalion commanders and medical 
officers viewed with suspicion those who fell too quickly or cracked 
under less than severe conditions. Doctors therefore needed to not 
only treat genuine cases of breakdown in battle but also detect 
instances of feigned mental illness.
Regardless of the exact cause, a psychiatric diagnosis or even 
the suspicion of nerves made an officer a dangerous liability to 
the performance and safety of his unit. Superiors recognised that 
wavering officers needed to be replaced quickly. Those who tried but 
failed to persevere might at least receive lenient treatment. Others 
who evidently refused to carry out their duties invited an adverse 
confidential report or worse. One “burned out” major, a Military 
Cross recipient, received sympathetic consideration from his CO who 
reported, “Although he tries hard and is a brave man he has had so 
many hard battles that he can no longer remain steady in battle.”19 A 
newly arrived officer’s admission of nervousness, alternatively, could 
be interpreted by less supportive superiors as a sign of weakness and 
lack of motivation. After leading a failed attack in Italy, one platoon 
leader admitted that he did not want responsibility for the lives of 
the thirty men under his direct command. His CO filed an adverse 
report in which he concluded that the officer “is young and not battle 
weary, he either lacks intestinal fortitude or else he is definitely a 
conscientious objector.”20 Most officers subject to an adverse report 
returned to England where they awaited a final decision on their fate; 
18  Terry Copp, “Battle Exhaustion and the Canadian Soldier in Normandy,” in 
Canadian Military History: Selected Readings, ed. Marc Milner (Toronto: Copp 
Clark Pitman, 1993), 240.
19  Confidential Report on Major G. L. F. McNeill, 9 January 1945, RG 24-C-2, vol. 
10031, 9/REPORTS/5, LAC.
20  OSCB report on Lieut. P. H. G Walker, 13 March 1945, RG 24, vol. 17497, case 
no. 446, LAC.
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rarely a second chance in the field, maybe an administrative posting 
or, most likely, a return to Canada.
discipline and desertion
Canadian reclassification boards assessed whether these 
underperforming officers would be retained for other duties or 
stripped of their commissions and discharged.21 The terminology 
often implied moral deficiencies and personal failings on the part 
of unwanted officers. In the army the favoured term was “lack of 
intestinal fortitude” while in the air force it was “lack of moral fibre.” 
Such labels carried a significant stigma although many still viewed 
this form of removal as less humiliating and scandalous than trial 
by general court martial.22 Generals worried that an administrative 
transfer, medical treatment or a return home allowed unmotivated 
officers an escape from the fighting that avoided the legal punishment 
of cashiering. To enforce a stronger deterrent effect and ensure that 
all ranks understood the consequences of failure in battle, army 
headquarters turned to the military justice system in exceptional 
circumstances where an officer’s conduct appeared to border on 
willful disobedience or outright cowardice.
Rooted in British military-legal precedent and tradition, the 
Canadian general court martial system depended on the judgment of 
five senior army officers at equivalent or higher rank than the accused 
officer. A legal officer from the judge advocate general’s office (JAG) 
served as prosecutor while a regimental officer, usually with legal 
training, acted as defence counsel. Based on witness testimony from 
superiors and subordinates, expert medical opinion and technical legal 
arguments, the court was to determine guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
A judge advocate presided to give advice on matters of military law 
and procedure.23 In Canada and the United Kingdom, general courts 
martial tried officers for all manner of offences under the Army Act 
from drunkenness and absence without leave to dishonoured cheques 
21  Geoffrey Hayes, Crerar’s Lieutenants: Inventing the Canadian Junior Army 
Officer, 1939-45 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2017), 205.
22  Allan English, Cream of the Crop: Canadian Aircrew 1939-1945 (Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996), 102, 118.
23  Chris Madsen, Another Kind of Justice: Canadian Military Law from Confederation 
to Somali (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1999), 77-84.
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and conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. Misconduct on the 
battlefield assumed greater severity as the consequences often meant 
life or death and victory or defeat. The highest penalty for most 
crimes was cashiering with or without imprisonment. Historically, 
cashiering represented the most disgraceful form of dismissal from 
military service in the British Army tradition. In a ritualised ceremony 
before fellow officers, the offender’s rank pips, buttons and epaulettes 
were torn from his uniform. By another historical custom—unevenly 
enforced in practice—a cashiered ex-officer could never again serve 
the crown in a military or civil capacity.24
For battalion commanders and general officers, failure in battle 
almost never resulted in formal charges and trial by court martial. 
Authorities found less public alternatives to deal with suspected 
breakdowns or even misconduct like drunkenness among colonels, 
brigadiers and generals. As illustrated by Booth’s case, the response 
might be limited to a severe yet private “tongue-lashing.”25 A discreet 
reassignment to less sensitive duties not only prevented a potential 
scandal that might undermine soldiers’ confidence in their leaders, 
but it also avoided the practical challenge of filling a court with 
general officers to try a peer. Compared to the higher commissioned 
ranks, lieutenants were far more likely to be disciplined by general 
court martial.26 Sentences of dismissal and cashiering imposed on 
even a few individuals served as clear warnings for the rest of the 
officer corps to appreciate the penalty for misconduct. 
The necessity to maintain high discipline and good morale 
meant that the military justice system prioritised prosecutions for 
malingering, desertion and cowardice while often treating other 
minor offences and transgressions more leniently.27 Under Section 12 
of the Army Act, a charge of desertion involved a deliberate evasion 
of duty with no intent to return. Compared to the lesser charge of 
absence without leave, desertion in a combat theatre was a relatively 
uncommon though severe crime in the Canadian Army.28 Although 
24  Matthew Barrett, Scandalous Conduct: Canadian Officer Courts Martial, 1914-
1945 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, forthcoming).
25  Quoted in Delaney, Corps Commanders, 236.
26  Based on an analysis of 530 Canadian Army officer courts martial, 66 per cent 
were for lieutenants. Only 1.7 per cent were for lieutenant-colonels or brigadiers. 
Canadian Army Courts Martial documents, RG 24, reels T-15545 to T-15870, LAC.
27  Engen, Strangers in Arms, 145.
28  Engen, Strangers in Arms, 230.
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cowardice constituted a separate offence in the Army Act, fleeing 
from danger carried the implication of excessive fear or cowardly 
motives. During the First World War, conviction had carried potential 
execution. However, since the abolition of the death penalty for most 
military crimes in 1930, typical sentences meant several years penal 
servitude.29 The prison terms imposed by courts martial were as 
much designed to create a deterrent for the entire army as they were 
to punish an individual offender. Harsh justice served as retribution 
against convicted individuals who had evidently abandoned comrades, 
especially during major offensives.30 
Following his discharge from Basingstoke under the suspicion 
of malingering, Woods became the target of the Canadian military 
justice system. Authorities placed him under arrest and returned 
him to the LSR in Holland where a summary of evidence and initial 
witness statements could be recorded. Facing a general court martial 
for desertion in February 1945, Woods still claimed he remembered 
nothing after his disappearance in France. The defence counsel, Lieut. 
E. J. McCormick, argued that Woods could not be held criminally 
responsible because his breakdown proved he should never have been 
medically cleared to join a reinforcement draft in the first place. 
Senior officers serving on a court martial board considered medical 
evidence of neuropsychiatric injury when judging criminal liability 
but most were inclined to reject mental illness as a defence against 
charges of serious military misconduct.31 The prosecuting officer, 
Captain E. L. Marrus, gathered eye-witnesses and medical experts 
to prove Woods criminally culpable for his entire illegal absence. As 
the judge advocate, Major G. M. Graham, explained: “the object of 
every court martial… is to determine questions of fact and law—did 
the facts alleged against the accused actually happen?”32 
What did actually happen to Lieut. Woods? Had he consciously 
fled only to feign amnesia? Or had he suffered a genuine mental 
breakdown that trigged sudden loss of identity and memory? The 
29  David French, “Discipline and the Death Penalty in the British Army in the War 
against Germany during the Second World War,” Journal of Contemporary History 
33, 4 (1998): 531-45.
30  Teresa Iacobelli, Death or Deliverance, Death or Deliverance: Canadian Courts 
Martial in the Great War (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 
2013), 107.
31  Madsen, Another Kind of Justice, 82-85.
32  GCM of Lieut. R. J. Woods, RG 24, reel T-15777, file 55-W-722, LAC.
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doctor’s diagnosis and the verdict of court members gave the impression 
of great certainty that Woods was in fact a deceptive deserter. Yet 
for a case centred on incomplete memories, conflicting testimony and 
legal technicalities, the incident contained more ambiguities, silences 
and doubts than a written recounting of the facts implied. 
why graphic history?
To explore the complexities and nuances in Woods’ case, this article 
adopts an experimental graphic history approach to illustrate the 
subjective and contingent nature of memory and truth through the 
fog of war. While still a relatively novel concept as scholarship, graphic 
history uses drawings and sequential art to create new opportunities 
for historical representation, interpretation and analysis.33 Graphic 
historians base their work on available documentation and research, 
but the need to make artistic and creative choices highlights the 
inherent gaps in the historical record and exposes the limitations of 
any claim to merely reproduce an objective reconstruction of the past. 
I elaborate on the academic validity of graphic history and address 
the challenges of this methodology in another article within this 
issue of Canadian Military History. I argue that “graphic histories 
by their visual nature make evident that which written history can 
often obscure—fictive elements and informed imagination are central 
to the production of any historical narrative whether told primarily 
by text or primarily by illustration.”34
Reading graphic histories requires the same critical thinking 
skills used when assessing any written work, but appreciating the 
33  There is a growing academic literature on the use and production of graphic 
history as scholarship and in education. Rob Kristofferson and Simon Orpana, 
“Shaping Graphic History: Primary Sources and Closure in Showdown! Making 
Modern Unions,” Labour/Le Travail 82 (2018): 189-226; Hugo Frey and Benjamin 
Noys, “History in the Graphic Novel,” Rethinking History 6, 3 (2002): 255-60; and 
Sean Carleton, “Drawn to Change: Comics and Critical Consciousness,” Labour/Le 
Travail 73 (2014): 154-60.
34  Matthew Barrett, “Historical Thinking and Visual Literacy: Exploring the 
Canadian War Museum with Graphic History,” Canadian Military History 30, 1 
(2021), 11.
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meaning of imagery also requires visual literacy.35 Recognising the 
subtlety of visual cues such as colour, style and layout is central 
to understanding the arguments and interpretations being presented 
by the artist and historian. The pictures therefore do not simply 
dramatise the text of an otherwise fairly dense archival court file. In 
this case, visualising the recollections of Woods, his doctors and other 
witnesses serves to identify key differences in the pictures presented 
to the court members. Throughout the trial, the prosecuting officer 
and defence counsel referred to these imagined pictures as each side 
crafted their own version of events based on medical evidence and 
stories from witness testimony. 
The images and the text of this article interact to show how 
assumptions about a range of concepts, including medical unfitness, 
willpower, mental illness and military law, shaped the perspectives of 
participants in the court martial. As the images are meant to reflect 
individual perceptions of the same incident, the article does not aim 
to reconstruct the case with precise authenticity nor definitively 
claim what actually happened to Woods. Instead, the illustrated 
narratives invite the reader to consider how the formal structure 
of the court martial, the quality of the evidence, the influence of 
individual memories and the gaps in the historical record contributed 
to creating the visual interpretations. The sequential art depicted in 
any graphic history is purposefully incomplete. As Alyson King notes 
in “Cartooning History,” graphic narratives require “read[ing] beyond 
the surface of the story.”36 When explaining the relationship between 
reader and art, comic book scholars refer to ideas of the “gutter” and 
“closure.”37 The gutter represents the blank space that separates each 
panel. Closure occurs when the reader completes the sequence of art 
by mentally linking one image to the next. Fragments of graphic and 
textual information are assembled to achieve closure, but readers may 
question to what extent closure can ever be complete or certain in a 
court martial that relied heavily on imperfect or missing memories. 
Visually, this graphic history draws inspiration from the classic 
war cartoons of Bill Mauldin and Bing Coughlin as well as from Scott 
35  Michael Pagliaro, “Is a Picture Worth a Thousand Words? Determining the 
Criteria for Graphic Novels with Literary Merit,” The English Journal 103, 4 
(2014): 31-45.
36  Alyson E. King, “Cartooning History: Canada’s Stories in Graphic Novel,” The 
History Teacher 45, 2 (2012): 201.
37  Sean Carleton, “Drawn to Change,” 162-63.
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Chantler’s Two Generals, a graphic memoir based on the Second 
World War experiences of his grandfather.38 The text is adapted from 
Woods’ court martial transcript itself, as well as from medical reports 
and written petitions in Woods’ army personnel file. My depiction of 
the main historical figures in this case—the accused officer (Woods), 
the prosecutor (Marrus), the defence counsel (McCormick), the judge 
advocate (Graham), the court president (Ware) and medical witness 
(Gould)—are based on available photographic references for each man. 
The faces of other named individuals, namely the other witnesses, 
are purposefully obscured or abstracted due to the lack of clear 
visual references. This limitation, however, serves another purpose 
to emphasise that the statements are being visualised through the 
individual witness’ point-of-view. The footnotes document the sources 
for the illustrations and explain creative choices.
38  Scott Chantler, Two Generals (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 2010).
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Footnote39
  Casualty telegram to his wife is reproduced from Lieut. Woods’ army personnel file. 
RG 24, file 332-103-220, LAC.
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Footnote40
  Woods’ narration (in white text boxes) on the next three pages quoted from the 
summary of evidence taken on 14 November 1944, contained in his GCM file, RG 24, 
reel T-15777, file 55-W-722, LAC.
15
Barrett: “He would be expected to crack”
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2021
16 “He would be expected to crack”
Footnote41
  Woods’ identification card is reproduced from his army personnel file. Canadian 
Military Headquarters (CMHQ) was located at 2–4 Cockspur Street, London (now 
Canada House).
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Footnote42
  The CMHQ medical officer’s sick report, dated 10 October 1944, is reproduced 
from Woods’ personnel file. Dr. Arthur Frank Chaisson’s diagnosis report, dated 
14 October 1944, is quoted from Woods’ personnel file. Chaisson (1903-1960), a 
graduate of Harvard University, was a Doctor of Public Health and director of 
mental hygiene in New Brunswick before the war.
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Footnote43
  During the First World War, hypnosis had been a controversial treatment for shell 
shock and was met with skepticism from traditionalist physicians. Tracey Loughran, 
Shell-Shock and Medical Culture in First World War Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), 103-05. As the psychological basis of battle exhaustion 
gained wider acceptance in the medical community, by the Second World War some 
army doctors turned to hypnotic techniques to recover lost memories although 
suspicions remained about efficacy. In psychiatry, a fugue state refers to a rare 
neurological or psychological condition that involves the patient’s claimed loss of 
identity. Symptoms include confusion, amnesia, erratic behaviours and inexplicable 
travel over long distances. For a contemporary understanding, see Charles Fisher, 
“Amnesic States in War Neuroses: The Psychogenesis of Fugues,” Psychoanalytic 
Quarterly 4, 4 (1945): 437-68.
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Footnote44
  Above scene is based on the photograph The Lake Superior Regiment leaving 
Port Arthur on Red River Road, 10 October 1940; see http://images.ourontario.
ca/gateway/56241/data. Middle photo is: Lake Superior Regiment (LSR), “A” 
Company, RV9 285/X3, LAC. Recruited from northern Ontario, the LSR mobilised 
for active service in November 1940. The unit was re-designated a motor battalion 
in January 1942. George Stanley, In the Face of Danger: The History of the Lake 
Superior Regiment (Port Arthur: Lake Superior Scottish Regiment, 1960), 84.
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Footnote45
  A Universal Carrier of The Lake Superior Regiment, Cintheaux, France, 8 August 
1944, photograph, PA-113651, LAC. The drawn map is adapted from A Brief History 
of the 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade in Action, July 1944-May 1945 (Mitcham, 
UK: West Brothers, 1945), 51.
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Footnote46
  For the action on 17 August 1944, the LSR war diary only referred to the advancing 
column as composed of “vehicles” and Woods’ court martial file only described his 
as the “platoon command vehicle.” As a motorised infantry regiment attached to an 
armoured brigade, the LSR would have had trucks, half-tracks and universal carriers. 
I have depicted Woods in a universal carrier as an artistic choice because he can be 
seen more clearly in an open-air vehicle rather than in an enclosed half-track. LSR 
War Diary, RG 24-C-3, vol. 15098, file 942, LAC.
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Footnote47
  Woods’ biographical sketch quoted on this and the previous three pages is from his 
personnel file. The original transcript is torn and therefore incomplete. Dr. Chaisson 
had encouraged the amnesic lieutenant to write down all that he remembered about 
his life. Woods had first joined the Non-Permanent Active Militia (NPAM) in 1935. 
He rose to the rank of sergeant in the peacetime LSR but accepted a reduction to 
private when he volunteered with the Active Army for overseas service in October 
1940. He had married his wife Gladys in Port Arthur in 1940 shortly after enlisting.
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Footnote48
  Image in bottom right evokes Tom Lea’s painting The Two Thousand Yard Stare 
(1945). Image in bottom middle refers to the infamous incident when US Army 
General George Patton struck two American GIs suspected to have been suffering 
from battle exhaustion. For the Patton slapping incident, see Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
Crusade in Europe (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1948), 179–80.
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Footnote49
  Gould’s diagnosis report, dated 1 November 1944, is reproduced from Woods’ 
personnel file. Dr. Charles Ernest Groves Gould (1908-1990), a graduate of the 
University of Southern California, had served as a neuropsychiatric specialist with 
the Canadian Army since April 1942. 
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Footnote50
  During the summary of evidence, Woods faced two charges under the Army Act—
Section 12 (desertion) and Section 5(7) (cowardice). Prosecutors dropped the latter 
charge before the proceedings began. Although the summary of evidence was held 
before LSR senior officers in Holland in November 1944, the trial was convened in the 
United Kingdom in February 1945. Throughout the war, even courts martial held in 
the UK were often listed as having taken place “in the field” for security purposes.
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Footnote51
  Major Gordon Mitchell Graham (1904-1971), a Nova Scotia lawyer, served as judge 
advocate on several Canadian courts martial. Some verdicts were later quashed due 
to Graham’s errors when directing court members on technical legal matters. Colonel 
Cameron Bethel Ware (1913-1999) had served as CO of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian 
Light Infantry in the Italian campaign until June 1944. Captain Elliott Lloyd Marrus 
(1913-1996) was a Toronto lawyer who joined the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps 
and later served with the JAG corps. Lieutenant Edward Joseph McCormick (1910- 
1997) was a Calgary criminal lawyer who had served with the NPAM since 1930. 
Just two weeks before Woods’ trial, McCormick had appeared before a reclassification 
board, which recommended putting him into action as an infantry officer, but he 
remained engaged in army legal work. OSCB, case no. 596. RG 24, vol. 17497, LAC.
27
Barrett: “He would be expected to crack”
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2021
28 “He would be expected to crack”
Footnote52
  All witness testimony and court dialogue are quoted from Woods’ GCM file, RG 24, 
reel T-15777, file 55-W-722, LAC. 
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Footnote53
  Isidoriou recalled seeing a haemorrhage in Woods’ right ear, suggesting a head wound 
or brain injury. After Gould claimed Woods confessed to deception, the lieutenant had 
slipped away from Basingstoke to Brighton in early November 1944. He resurfaced 
again at Isidoriou’s house before the civil police took him back to the hospital. Although 
Isidoriou related this incident in the summary of evidence, defence counsel McCormick 
kept it out of the court martial record. Leaving hospital without permission technically 
constituted a separate military crime for which Woods was not charged.
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Footnote54
  Page is reproduced from War Office, Manual of Military Law (London: His Majesty’s 
Stationery Office, 1907), 74.
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Footnote55
  An unsworn statement allowed the accused to address the court without being cross-
examined by the prosecutor. As the judge advocate warned, unsworn statements 
carried little weight with court members.
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Footnote56
  Each red chevron on the sleeve of a uniform marked 12-months’ active service. The 
white chevron noted at least one-year of military service prior to September 1939. 
In his plea for mitigation, McCormick begged the court to consider this long service 
in sentencing. The defence counsel pointed out that cashiering would deny Woods’ 
access to veteran grants and benefits from the federal government.
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Footnote57
  Major-General P. J. Montague, chief of staff at CMHQ, confirmed Woods’ sentence, 
although he remitted seven years from the twelve-year prison term.
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Footnote58
  The quotes from petitions that Woods wrote in prison are contained in his GCM file. 
His Majesty’s (HM) Prison Dartmoor was built in the Napoleonic Wars. During the 
world wars, it held civilian convicts, military prisoners and conscientious objectors. 
Woods began his imprisonment in March 1945 at HM Prison Winchester before 
being transferred to Dartmoor.
45
Barrett: “He would be expected to crack”
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2021
46 “He would be expected to crack”
Footnote59
  After V-E Day, Canadian soldiers in Europe could volunteer for service in the Pacific 
theatre where the war against Japan was not yet over. Unlike Woods, a small number 
of Canadian soldier-convicts received early release with the promise to re-enlist for 
this campaign that never came. Japan surrendered on 2 September 1945. 
46
Canadian Military History, Vol. 30 [2021], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol30/iss1/4
  47B A R R E T T 
Footnote60
  Document is reproduced from Woods’ GCM file. Brigadier R. J. Orde served as 
Canada’s Judge Advocate General from 1920 to 1950. Upon Woods’ return to 
Canada in March 1946, he was held at No. 89 Detention Barracks in Fort Henry, 
Kingston until his release in June.
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Footnote61
  Woods’ campaign and service medals (clockwise from upper left): Canadian Volunteer 
Service Medal (with clasp), War Medal 1939-45, France and Germany Star, Defence 
Medal and 1939-45 Star. When applying for a visa to move to the United States in 
1955, Woods requested a copy of his discharge papers to validate honourable release 
status. Due to the quashed sentence, his service record appeared no different than 
most fellow Canadian veterans.
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epilogue
Based on the recommendation of Judge Advocate General R. J. Orde, 
the conviction against Woods was quashed, which “relieved [him] 
from all consequences of his trial.”62 Thus, from a legal standpoint, 
the entire incident was supposed to be expunged from Woods’ record. 
However, from an administrative perspective, Woods had still been 
absent for fifty-five days and had remained inactive for several more 
months while in hospital, at trial and in prison. Unsatisfied that 
a legal technicality had evidently let Woods off easy, some army 
officials wanted to impose a financial punishment. As Woods had 
not performed any military duties, vice adjutant-general W. H. S. 
Macklin argued that the lieutenant should forfeit all pay from his 
disappearance on 17 August 1944 until his release from confinement 
on 15 June 1946. Macklin explained that the choice between paying 
or not “depends entirely on what we may consider would be just 
and fair to this officer and to the taxpayers.”63 Although the trial 
had been declared void, Macklin and other army officials still cited 
Gould’s medical opinion that Woods had deliberately evaded duty. 
The deputy adjutant-general remarked, “Morally, I think such 
forfeiture is justified. Legally, however, I am not so sure.”64
Orde countered that Woods’ failure to perform military service 
while confined to Basingstoke as a patient, when under arrest or 
when in a penitentiary could hardly be considered “voluntary on his 
part.”65 Army adjutant-general E. G. Weeks decided Woods would 
lose only fifty-five days’ pay from 17 August until his reappearance 
at CMHQ on 10 October. The decision on length of eligible service 
had important implications on claims for the war service gratuity, 
veteran grants and rehabilitation credits.66 The debate over pay 
signalled the army’s desire to find a logical and consistent resolution 
to a complicated case. Macklin, who blamed Woods for the entire 
62  P.C. 1089, 11 June 1946, RG 24, reel T-15777, file 55-W-722, LAC.
63  W. H. S. Macklin to R. J. Orde, 8 July 1946, RG 24, reel T-15777, file 55-W-722, LAC.
64  H. D. Howard to W. H. S. Macklin, 6 July 1946, RG 24, reel T-15777, file 55-W-
722, LAC.
65  R. J. Orde to W. H. S. Macklin, 10 July 1946, RG 24, reel T-15777, file 55-W-722, LAC.
66  With six years’ service including three and a half years overseas (excluding fifty-
five days), Woods earned a War Service Grant plus rehabilitation grants and re-
establishment credits for $2,471.81. Adjusted for inflation, this would amount to 
$37,318.96 in 2021. Bank of Canada Inflation Calculator, accessed 18 March 2021, 
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/related/inflation-calculator/.
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incident, argued that “logic indicates ‘all’ or ‘nothing.’”67 Framing 
the problem around Woods’ alleged amnesia meant that Macklin 
could only see the lieutenant as either a mentally ill patient who 
deserved all compensation or a willful deserter who earned nothing. 
By only forfeiting a fraction of Woods’ pay, army administration 
struck a compromise that acknowledged he had been illegally absent 
for causes unknown but avoided passing judgement on his mental 
health at the time.
Despite incomplete details and conflicting accounts, this history 
when documented through the law or medicine tended to privilege a 
single, coherent narrative. Woods was either guilty or not. He was 
either mentally responsible or not. He was either legitimately ill or 
faking. A graphic history approach requires readers to confront the 
incompleteness of the historical record in Woods’ case. A court martial 
connected fragments of evidence largely from witness testimony to 
determine what happened beyond a reasonable doubt. A medical 
diagnosis likewise pieced together information and observations to 
separate a genuine condition from malingering. Connecting selected 
visual and written elements is necessary to fill gaps in the court 
proceedings, the medical evidence, the witness accounts and the 
accused’s own memory. This process of informed imagination allows 
for multiple possible interpretations to make sense of the past, but it 
also exposes the limits of history, whether in graphic form or text, to 
pierce the fog of war.
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
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67  W. H. S. Macklin to R.J. Orde, 8 July 1946, RG 24, reel T-15777, file 55-W-
722, LAC.
50
Canadian Military History, Vol. 30 [2021], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol30/iss1/4
